An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers by Schmidt, Tobias
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-048
An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effects of Patents and Secrecy 
on Knowledge Spillovers
Tobias Schmidt
Dis cus si on Paper No. 06-048
An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effects of Patents and Secrecy 
on Knowledge Spillovers
Tobias Schmidt
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06048.pdf
Non-technical summary 
The literature on knowledge spillovers has shown that the need for external 
knowledge has increased in recent years because technologies and markets are become 
more and more complex. As firms’ innovation activities become more and more 
dependent on external knowledge, the amount of knowledge available to them 
becomes a critical factor for innovation and growth. 
The amount of freely available knowledge depends on the amount of knowledge 
generated and the amount of knowledge appropriated by the producers of new 
knowledge. In this study we will focus on the latter aspect and empirically investigate 
the impact of the importance of two different methods of knowledge appropriation on 
the innovation activities of firms. To be more precise, we will analyse the effect of the 
usage of patent protection and secrecy on knowledge spillovers. Since spillover effects 
cannot be observed directly, we will look at the results of knowledge spillovers. These 
results can partially be observed by looking at the innovation activities of firms that 
(potentially) use external knowledge. We argue that the usage of patents and secrecy 
should affect the level of spillovers and thus decrease or increase (depending on the 
method used) the importance of a lack of technological information as a hampering 
factor for firms’ technological innovation processes. 
The effect of patents and secrecy on knowledge spillovers is not clear per se. 
Theoretical considerations suggest that secrecy reduces spillovers almost completely 
through non-disclosure, while the disclosure requirement of patents generates some 
knowledge spillovers and at the same time allows firms to appropriate knowledge 
through legal rights. Empirical research has shown, however, that secrecy is not 
perfect and some spillovers occur even when firms use secrecy. What is more, some 
knowledge, such as that embodied in products, cannot be protected by secrecy. It has 
been argued that firms are no longer using patents to protect knowledge but rather to 
be able to broker and share knowledge (“Open Innovation approach” Chesbrough, 
2003b). 
Using firm level data on 3,400 firms from the 4th Community Innovation Survey for 
Germany we find that both the usage of patents and secrecy decrease knowledge 
spillovers to other firms in an industry and consequently pose obstacles to their 
innovation activities. As a result we can conclude that the appropriability effect 
outweighs the disclosure effect of patents within an industry. We do not find a 
significant effect of protection methods used in other industries on the lack of 
information on technologies a firm is faced with. A third result is that the open 
innovation business model has not been implemented widely. 
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Abstract 
 
Theoretical considerations suggest that secrecy reduces spillovers almost completely 
through non-disclosure, while the disclosure requirement of patents generates some 
spillover and at the same time allows firms to appropriate knowledge. In this paper we 
empirically analyze whether protection by secrecy or protection by patents is 
associated with lower knowledge spillovers. Since the amount of knowledge spillovers 
is hard to measure directly, we look at the impact of the usage of protection methods in 
an industry on the innovation activities of firms using external knowledge. One goal is 
to assess if firms have moved to a more open innovation business model, i.e. allow 
more knowledge spillovers to occur despite using protection methods. Our estimations 
show that the usage of both, patents and secrecy, hinders the innovation activities of 
firms through the reduction of spillovers to firms in their own industry. We conclude 
that the appropriability effect of patents outweighs the disclosure effect. We also find 
some evidence that the open innovation business model has not been implemented 
widely.  
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1 Introduction 
“Open Innovation” is a new way of thinking about the innovation process of firms 
(Chesbrough, 2003b). Due to significant changes in the competitive and economic 
environment of firms, closed innovation, i.e. one firm does everything from R&D to 
marketing and financing of innovations on its own, are no longer seen as profitable 
strategies for innovative enterprises. Thus, Chesbrough (2003b) argues that firms 
have to become more open and reach out to actors beyond their own boundaries to 
make the most of their inventions and ideas. This includes “knowledge brokering” 
(Chesbrough, 2003b: 52) and using intellectual property and other appropriability 
mechanisms to profit from other firms’ use of the firm’s own knowledge. 
The need for external knowledge and other external inputs in the innovation 
process has also been noted by other authors, like Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003), 
Peters (2003) or Fagerberg (2005). Fagerberg's (2005) literature review shows that 
firms’ innovation activities rely extensively on external resources. 
Nooteboom (1999) argues that the need for external knowledge increased because 
technologies and markets become more and more complex. The need for external 
knowledge is increasing and more firms are likely to move to an open innovation 
approach.1 The amount of knowledge available in an economy is becoming an 
important factor for innovation and growth. The amount of freely available 
knowledge depends on the amount of knowledge generated and the amount of 
knowledge appropriated by the producers of new knowledge. In this study we will 
focus on the latter aspect and investigate the impact of the importance of two 
different appropriability methods on the innovation activities of firms. To be more 
precise, we will analyse the effect of the usage of patent protection and secrecy in an 
industry, on knowledge spillovers. Since spillover effects cannot be directly 
observed, we will lock at the results of these spillovers which can partially be 
observed, by analysing the innovation activities of firms (potentially) using external 
knowledge. We argue that the usage of patents and secrecy should affect the level of 
spillovers and thus decrease or increase (depending on the method used) the 
importance of a lack of technological information as a hampering factor for firms’ 
technological innovation processes. 
The difference between secrecy and patents has been analysed to a great extend in 
previous studies (see next section). However, few attempts have been made to 
empirically assess their effect on knowledge spillovers. While secrecy, as the word 
implies, reduces spillovers through non-disclosure, the effects of patents is less clear. 
Patents can generate knowledge spillovers through the disclosure requirements laid 
down in patent laws, but at the same time limit knowledge spillovers by allowing 
firms developing new knowledge to use it exclusively for a given period of time. 
                                                 
1 Two prominent examples that have adopted a more open innovation strategy are IBM and Microsoft (NY 
Times, 2005a; NY Times, 2005b) 
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The difference between formal and strategic protection methods with respect to 
knowledge spillovers is interesting from a policy point of view. If both groups of 
protection methods influence the importance of the lack of technological information 
as an obstacle to innovation with the same order of magnitude and direction, this 
would be an indication that the patent system doesn’t have the desired effect of 
disclosing valuable and usable knowledge or at least that the firms requiring external 
knowledge for their innovation activities, can’t get access to the relevant knowledge 
flows.2 
This dual effect of patents on knowledge spillovers brings us back to the open 
innovation paradigm: 
If open innovation were the business model of an industry and firms would use IP 
rights to increase the usage of their own knowledge by others, the use of patent 
protection should not reduce knowledge spillovers and the ability of other firms to 
get access to the knowledge needed for their innovation activities. Under such a 
regieme firms would patent their inventions in order to be able to make it available to 
firms in need of external knowledge, i.e. license it or even give away patented 
knowledge for free (Chesbrough, 2003b). Because of that, the disclosure and 
licensing effect of patents should outweigh its appropriability effect and knowledge 
spillovers should at least not decrease. If patents still lead to a decrease of knowledge 
spillovers, this may be some indication that the term “open innovation” is rather as 
an advertising stunt. Firms give the impression that they give away valuable 
knowledge, but still use it to secure valuable knowledge instead of making it 
available to others. 
An extreme case of open innovation would be “open source”. Some times the 
impression is given by people talking about open innovation, that open innovation is 
equal to open source, i.e. that all knowledge is readily available to everyone and 
patent protection is just needed to be able to license new technologies to others and 
not to inhibit the use of knowledge. We think, however, and will test the assumption, 
that patents are still used by firms to limit the flow of useful and usable knowledge to 
external agents. In that sense, our analysis can be seen as an attempt to test one key 
aspect of the open innovation paradigm, namely the notion that firms use patents not 
to limit knowledge flows but to increase them. 
In the next section we will review the relevant literature on the effect of different 
legal and strategic protection methods on knowledge flows. Particular attention is 
given to mechanisms that might explain the gap between the desired effect of 
protection and the actual effect of protection. To be more precise, we will shed some 
light on the question why patent protection methods may fail in disclosing useful 
knowledge and why strategic protection methods like secrecy will not be perfectly 
efficient in reducing the outflow of knowledge. In section 3 our hypothesis and 
analytical framework will be described, followed by a section on the data and 
                                                 
2 Note, the lack of information on technology might also be a hampering factor for the innovation activities of 
firms, because they lack the absorptive capacity to access and use relevant knowledge. In the empirical 
part, we will try to take this into account. 
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estimation strategy used. Results will be presented and discussed in section 5, before 
we conclude. 
2 Related Literature 
In this section we will start with a review of the literature relevant for our analysis 
of the relationship between different protection methods for innovations, inventions, 
new knowledge, and knowledge spillovers. Afterwards, a short review of the main 
features of the “open innovation” paradigm will be provided to enrich our discussion 
of the topic from the introduction. 
Legal Protection vs. Strategic Protection 
Because “rents derive from idiosyncratic knowledge” (Liebeskind, 1997: 623), 
securing the returns and rents from innovation activities is one of the main concerns 
of firms developing new products and processes. Moreover, it is in the public interest 
to make sure that at least some part of the rents can be appropriated by the firm that 
developed an invention or innovation, in order to set incentives for private R&D and 
innovation activities. Put differently, firms wouldn’t have an incentive to invest in 
the development of new knowledge if all the benefits would spill over to their 
competitors. The well known free rider problem arises because “[…] knowledge is 
inherently a public good” (Jaffe, 1986: 984; Liebeskind, 1997: 624; Peters, 2003), 
i.e. it is non-rival in consumption and (partially) non-excludable3 (Hanusch and 
Cantner, 1993; Stiglitz, 1999). Because of the latter feature of knowledge, firms can 
profit from the inventions of others, either in the form of rent spillovers or 
knowledge spillovers (Griliches, 1979). However, not all knowledge is available to 
everyone in an economy for free. There are some factors that hinder the flow of 
knowledge, e.g. firms might have to invest in R&D in order to develop the capacity 
to understand and be able to utilize the knowledge generated by others (“absorptive 
capacity”), as shown by Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 1990). Another factor is the 
technological and geographical distance between the firm that produces the 
knowledge and the firm that wants to use it.4 
While the absorptive capacity and the distance between two firms reduces the 
amount of knowledge spilling over because of the set-up of the receiving firm, the 
firm generating the knowledge can also reduce the flow of knowledge by employing 
certain protection methods. These protection methods for new knowledge can be 
                                                 
3 Arrow (1962) wrote on this issue “No amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable 
commodity of something as intangible as information. The very use of the information in any productive 
way is bound to reveal it, at least in part. […] Legally imposed property rights can provide only a partial 
barrier, since there are obviously enormous difficulties in defining in any sharp way an item of 
information and differentiating it from similar sounding items.” (Arrow, 1962: 615).  
4 An overview of factors moderating the flow of knowledge can be found in Kaiser (2002), Cincera (2005) and 
Griliches (1992). 
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placed into two large groups: legal protection methods (such as patents, copyrights 
and trademarks) and methods that rely on secrecy, complexity of design and fast- or 
first-mover advantages (hence forth called “strategic protection methods”).5 The two 
famous reports on the Yale survey (Levin et al., 1987) and Carnegie Mellon survey 
(Cohen et al., 2000) have shown that firms use both methods to protect their 
intellectual property and their knowledge. These and other studies (e.g. Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998; Harabi, 1995) also revealed that the importance firms give to legal and 
strategic mechanisms varies by industry and the type of innovation to be protected. 
Sometimes an invention is even protected by more than one type of appropriability 
measure (e.g. Cohen and Walsh, 2000 or Arora, 1997 for an example from the 
chemical industry). Other factors that influence the choice of the appropriability 
mechanism and the importance assigned to one or the other mechanism have been 
put forward: Anton and Yao’s (2004) theoretical model shows that the “size” of 
innovations in terms of cost differentials and pre- and post-innovation market shares 
plays a role for the choice of appropriability strategy. Arundel’s (2001) analysis of 
data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS I) reveals that firm size reduces 
the relative importance of secrecy compared to patents while cooperation in R&D 
increases the importance of patents relative to secrecy. König and Licht (1995) find 
that the amount spent on R&D and the size of a firm positively influence the number 
of patent applications. Laursen and Salter (2005) and Liebeskind (1997) argue that 
the type of knowledge influences the choice of protection methods. 
Our focus in this paper is, however, not on the mechanisms that lead firms to use 
one or the other method or to assign different importance to different measures, but 
on how the use of different protection methods affects knowledge spillovers. While 
knowledge disclosure and dissemination is at the core of the legal protection system, 
strategic protection methods are mostly targeted at preventing knowledge spillovers. 
The rationale behind setting up a legal protection system is to grant an inventing 
firm the right to use their new knowledge exclusively for a given time (Levin et al., 
1987) and thus setting incentives for private investment in innovation activities6, 
while at the same time making the new knowledge available to outsiders by 
requirements to disclose knowledge (see e.g. Gallini, 2002; Markiewicz, 2003). In 
principle, the patent system is designed to exclude others from using the new 
invention and particularly the knowledge associated with it, while allowing them to 
access the new knowledge and learn from it. Legal protection methods provide 
protection for knowledge that is enforceable in court, but knowledge physically spills 
over through the text of the patent. As a result firms might see the knowledge 
published in the patent application as protected (“useless”) knowledge rather than a 
knowledge spillover.7 However, the disclosure of (protected) knowledge can also be 
a source for new ideas for new products or processes and provide information about 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Harabi (1995), Cohen and Walsh (2000), Laursen and Salter (2005) 
6 Arrow, 1962 already noted that the appropriability conditions play an important role for the innovation 
activities of firms. 
7 As Arrow (1962) noted some (involuntary) spillovers will always occure, because there is no perfect 
appropriation mechanism for “something so intangible as knowledge” (Arrow, 1962: 615). 
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the developments of competitors and consequently knowledge spillovers beyond 
those protected by law. If the protection effect outweighs the disclosure effect, legal 
protection actually reduces knowledge spillovers rather than fostering them.8 This 
has been argued to be the case by several empirical studies using the importance of 
legal protection measures as an inverse measure of outgoing spillovers, thus 
implying that legal protection methods limit outgoing spillovers rather than inducing 
them (see Bönte and Keilbach, 2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et 
al., 2004).  
The requirements to disclose (novel) knowledge when using legal protection 
methods is usually seen as a disincentive for adopting a strategy that is based on 
legal protection (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Levin et al., 1987; Arora et al., 2005; 
Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Hussinger, 2004). The reason for this may be that the 
patent system fails to exclude others from using the disclosed knowledge. The 
famous Mansfield et al.’s (1981) study shows that 60% of all patented innovations in 
their sample were imitated within 4 years.  
Then again, Bessen (2005) cites some studies that shows that firms do not assign 
much value to the information disclosed in patents, raising doubts that significant 
knowledge spillovers arise from patents. In an early work on the topic Malchup and 
Penrose (1950) write that “only unconcealable inventions are patented” (Malchup 
and Penrose, 1950: 27), indirectly saying that the knowledge disclosed in patent 
applications would also have spilled out through different channels. 
Cohen et al. (2002) stress that the information disclosed in patents is not very 
valuable because of the lag between publication of the patent and application for the 
patent. By the time the patent is published the disclosed knowledge has usually 
become outdated. Before the patent is in force, the knowledge is rather secret.9  
Strategic protection methods are used by firms without any legal basis and 
consequently without any requirements to disclose knowledge. Because of that, 
“firms that do not wish to disclose information can forgo patenting and use secrecy 
to protect their investment in innovation” (Arundel, 2001: 612). The effect of 
strategic protection methods on knowledge flows has been mostly analysed with 
respect to secrecy. Secrecy is - as the word already implies - the non-disclosure of 
knowledge. Atallah’s (2004) theoretical model is an example that uses this feature of 
secrecy. In his model the use of secrecy increases the cost of rivals by limiting 
knowledge spillovers. Empirical models analysing the co-operation decision of firms 
also assume that strategic protection methods limit outgoing knowledge spillovers 
(e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Bönte and Keilbach, 
2005; Schmidt, 2005b). Strategic protection methods other than secrecy, however, do 
not (exclusively) rely on keeping knowledge secret, but on being first with the 
                                                 
8 The protection effect can only outweigh the disclosure effect if knowledge spillovers are defined as the 
disclosure of freely usable knowledge. If they are defined as the disclosure of knowledge in general, patent 
protection is always increasing knowledge spillovers. We would argue that firms at the receiving end of 
the knowledge transfer are likely to favour the first definition. Similarly De Bondt (1996) writes “ spillvers 
only refer to the useful part of the information that has been exchanged.” (De Bondt, 1996:.4) 
9 Note, this was a peculiarity of the US patent system until 2001, the European Patent Office publishes the 
patent application a short time after it was received. 
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introduction of a novel product or process, reaping first mover benefits or by 
designing an innovation in a complex way that hinders competitors to reengineer 
them. These help to appropriate the returns of an innovation (Levin et al., 1987), but 
discloses knowledge.10  
The view that secrecy decreases knowledge spillovers has been challenged by a 
number of authors. Liebeskind (1997) shows, that keeping inventions and knowledge 
secret is very hard and costly. Levin et al. (1987) see a problem for keeping product 
related knowledge secret, because the product has to be advertised and put into the 
hands of the customers (and thus potentially also in the hands of their competitors) in 
order to earn money with it. By putting the product on the market, the knowledge 
embodied is disclosed and can not be kept secret any longer.11 Kultti et al. (2002) 
state that there will always be some spillovers, even if firms try to keep innovations 
secret. Their view is indirectly supported by studies that assume that methods to 
protect inventions and to prohibit knowledge flows, are never perfect.  
Secrecy might also be an imperfect method to appropriate knowledge if the 
knowledge itself is of a specific kind. Cohen and Walsh (2000) for example argue 
that more generic knowledge makes secrecy “less effective as an appropriability 
strategy” (Cohen and Walsh, 2000: 10). 
What is “Open Innovation”?12 
“Open innovation” can be defined as “accessing and exploiting outside knowledge 
while liberating [a firm’s] own internal expertise for others’ use.” (Chesbrough, 
2003a: 12). According to Chesbrough (2003b) firms have to open up because of 
changes in their competitive environment, like an increased mobility of skilled labor 
or shorter shelf lifes (product life circles) of technologies. The basic assumption 
behind the concept is that firms profit from sharing knowledge and ideas with other 
firms. The opening up includes “knowledge brokering” (Chesbrough, 2003b: 52) and 
using intellectual property and other appropriability mechanisms to profit from other 
firms’ use of a firm’s own knowledge and make their own knowledge and 
capabilities known to potential partners13. The open innovation concept thus sheds a 
different light on the disclosure component of patents. While the authors cited above 
have mostly seen the requirement of patents to disclose knowledge as a disincentive 
for seeking patent protection, Chesbrough suggests that firms should actively use this 
feature of the system to profit from their own knowledge. The two approaches also 
propose a different way of thinking about appropriability mechanisms and 
                                                 
10 Some doubts remain whether first-mover advantages are beneficial, because smart followers might imitate 
the original innovation quite fast. This can of course only be done because knowledge becomes available 
outside the firms boundaries if a protection method based on lead-time advantages is chosen (see Sofka 
and Schmidt, 2004 for an overview of first-mover advantages and disadvantages). 
11 One has to distinguish between invention and innovation here. An invention might very well be kept secret 
until it becomes an innovation, i.e. is introduced into the market (see Arundel, 2001: 613). 
12 This section is entirely based on the seminal work on this topic by Chesbrough (2003b). 
13 Similarly Bureth et al., 2006 and Penin, 2005 argue that patents are used as a coordination device and 
resolve uncertainty about a firms capabilities and strengths in the co-operation process. They don’t 
specifically make references to the open innovation paradigm, however 
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knowledge spillovers. While in the open innovation business model patents would be 
used to increase and manage spillovers to external agents in order to secure profits, 
the classical view is that appropriability must limit spillovers of useful/important 
knowledge to competitors to allow firms to reap the benefits of their inventions and 
innovations. 
In contrast to that, the open innovation paradigm, which suggests among other 
things that firms use the patent system to make their knowledge and capabilities 
known, can be seen as a strategy where more importance is given to the disclosure 
effect than the protection effect. Firms may actively use patents as a channel for 
disseminating knowledge to the outside world and increase the amount of valuable 
and usable knowledge disclosed through patents. 
There is some indication in the literature that open innovation could be simply used 
as a marketing stunt. As some authors have argued (see above) the knowledge 
disclosed in the patent applications can be of little value to other firms. Thus a mere 
increase in patent activities and making patented knowledge available for free by 
firms advertising themselves as being open, will not necessarily be an indication of a 
strategy that embraces knowledge sharing more. 
 
Hypotheses 
The hypothesis we derive form the review of the literature are the following: 
H1: Patent protection is used to prevent knowledge spillovers. Thus, an increase in 
the usage of patent protection methods in an industry does increase the perceived 
importance of the lack of technological knowledge as a hampering factor for 
innovation14. 
H2: Protection by secrecy does moderate knowledge spillovers. Thus, an increase 
in the usage of secrecy in an industry does increase the perceived importance of the 
lack of technological knowledge as a hampering factor for innovation. 
As far as hypothesis 1 is concerned, it is not unlikely that the protection effect 
might outweigh the disclosure effect since the firm developing an innovation will 
usually try to reduce the spillovers to others in order to increase their rent, even if 
they choose patents instead of strategic protection. Since this argument is contrary to 
the suggestions of the “open innovation” concept, that patents are used to disclose 
knowledge, hypothesis 1 can be used to analyse the diffusion of the open innovation 
strategy.  
                                                 
14 The importance of a lack of technological knowledge as a hampering factor for innovation activities will be 
used in the empirical part as our measure of spillovers or rather the lack of spillovers. For this reason it is 
included in the hypothesis.  
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3 Analytical Framework  
Our focus in this paper is to assess the impact of the usage of different protection 
methods in a particular industry on the perceived importance of a lack of information 
on technologies for innovation activities of firms in that industry. Two basic 
assumptions guide our approach: First, the importance of a lack of technological 
knowledge is higher (lower) if knowledge spillovers are lower (higher). Second, the 
level of knowledge spillovers is determined by the protection method used, i.e. 
patents or secrecy. 
The following figure summarizes the empirical model we have in mind. It 
represents the arguments from the literature that patents and secrecy differ with 
respect to the disclosure requirements, i.e. that patents have both a disclosure and an 
appropriability effect while secrecy has only an appropriability effect. We also 
include the demand for knowledge in the analytical model. It is certainly a factor that 
influences the importance firms assign to knowledge spillovers. Firms that need a lot 
of knowledge, because of their size, technology or specific innovation and R&D 
activities will be more likely to run into problems with acquiring knowledge for their 
innovation processes15. 
                                                 
15 For some empirical evidence on this issue see the study by Rammer et al., 2005b on SMEs. 
 9
Figure 1 Expected effects of different types of protection methods 
The set-up chosen poses some measurement issues: The first one concerns the 
measure of knowledge spillovers a firm receives: By looking at obstacles to the 
innovation activities of firms relying on external knowledge (at the receiving end of 
the knowledge spillover) we are not able to measure a lack of “actual” spillovers, but 
rather a lack of “perceived” spillovers. These two types of spillovers are likely to be 
very different. While the former is a measure of the amount of knowledge in an 
industry that is not generated or not available, the lack of perceived spillovers, is the 
amount of knowledge not apprehended (or deemed not accessible) by firms. In our 
opinion, the lack of perceived spillovers should be higher than the lack of actual 
spillovers.  
New Knowledge
Importance of lack of information on technology as an obstacle
to innovation
Patent Protection
D
isclosure
Effect (-)
A
ppropriabitlity
Effect (+)
Protection by Secrecy
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Demand for New Knowledge
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Since the knowledge spillovers we are interested in do not arise within a single 
firm, but between firms, 16 we will investigate the impact of the usage of protection 
methods by firms in an industry (excluding the firm in question) on the importance 
of the lack of technological knowledge as hampering factor at a given firm. This is 
not without problems, as the importance of this obstacle to innovation activities will 
not only be influenced by the use of protection methods but also by certain firm 
characteristics that are related to the demand for knowledge, the ability to generate 
knowledge in-house and the firms ability to access external knowledge. The latter is 
usually referred to as “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989;1990; 
Daghfous, 2004; Zahra and George, 2000). We will include variables for these three 
concepts in our estimation model, but obviously cannot control for these aspects in 
full. In particular the demand for knowledge is hard to measure and can thus only be 
approximated. 
A third issue is that the appropriability and disclosure effect of patents do not 
coincide in time for a single patent. The appropriability effects sets in when the 
application is filed (“first to file” rule in European patent law) and the disclosure 
effect when the application is published (1.5 years after filing). Since we don’t 
analyse single patents but the overall effect of the importance of patents on 
knowledge spillovers, this problem is mitigates for our study. What is more, we are 
interested in the overall effect of the usage of patents in an industry during a three 
year period and not on the effect of a single patent. 
4 Data and Estimation Strategy 
For this study we use firm-level data from the fourth Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS IV), which was carried out in 2005 and examined innovation activities 
during the period 2002 - 2004. In Germany, the CIS IV survey was conducted by the 
Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) and Frauenhofer Institute for 
System- und Innovationresearch (Fh-ISI) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research (bmbf). It is part of a larger effort to gather data on the 
innovation behaviour of German firms in industry and services through annual 
innovation surveys called the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP).17 Even though the 
survey is conducted annually in Germany and set-up as a panel, we only analyze 
cross-sectional data, mainly because the questions needed to construct our variables 
are not included every year. Most other studies using the innovation survey18 only 
use firms with innovation activities. For our study, however, the data needed is 
                                                 
16 This is probably one reason, why according to Laursen and Salter (2005) most studies in this field have been 
conducted on the industry level. 
17 A detailed description of the survey can be found in Janz et al. (2001) and Rammer et al. (2005c). All these 
surveys use the definitions and concepts of the so called “Oslo Manual” (OECD and Eurostat, 1997). 
18 A list of studies conducted with the Mannheim Innovation Panel can be found at 
http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/innovationserhebungen/wissaufsaetze.php3 
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available for almost all firms in the sample, i.e. we analyze about 3,900 firms from 
industry and services with 5 or more employees. 
The independent variable is representing the importance of the lack of information 
on technology as a hampering factor for innovation (hemm_tech_info). It is directly 
derived from a question on the hampering factors firms experienced in their 
innovation activities during the period 2002-2004. In this question firms were asked 
to rate the importance of 14 different hampering factors on a 4 point-likert scale 
ranging from 0 (not relevant) to 3 (very important). Because of this natural ordering 
of the responses to this question, we use the ordered probit procedure, which will be 
described in more detail below, for estimating our empirical model. It is noteworthy, 
that the question does not ask specifically for a lack of external information on 
technology. Assuming that firms which lack technological information internally 
would either invest in overcoming that lack or try to fill the void by looking for 
information beyond their own boundaries, we argue that the question mainly captures 
the external lack of information. We also argue that if they can’t invest in 
overcoming the lack of technological knowledge themselves, they would rather see 
the lack of finance as a hampering factor, which was also listed in that question, than 
the lack of information. 
The four key explanatory variables - representing the importance of patent 
protection and protection by secrecy in an industry19 - were constructed using a 
question on the importance of patents, registration of design patterns, industrial 
designs, trademarks, copyrights, secrecy, complexity of design, and lead-time 
advantages on competitors:20  
Patent protection (pat_ind) is represented by the industry (NACE 2) average of the 
importance of patents for protecting innovations or inventions, rescaled between one 
(highly important) and zero (not important at all). The same measure is also included 
at the sector level (manufacturing vs. services) to control for intra-industry spillover 
effects (pat_sector).21  
Protection by Secrecy (secr_ind) is constructed as the industry (NACE 2) mean of 
the importance of secrecy for protecting innovations or inventions, rescaled between 
one (highly important) and zero (not important at all). The same measure is also 
                                                 
19 To reduce a possible endogeneity, we calculated these two measures for each firm separately, i.e. the 
industry average was calculated without the firm in question. It thus represents the average over all other 
firms in the industry. 
20 The question in the German questionnaire differs from the standard CIS IV question on intellectual property 
rights by not only asking for the usage of different methods, but for the importance of the measure. The 
question in the German questionnaire was: “During the period 2002-2004 did your enterprise use any of 
the following intellectual property protection methods? If so: Please indicate the importance of these 
methods for protecting innovations and inventions of your enterprise.” Each method was rated on a 4 point 
likert-scale from 0 (not used) to 3 (highly important). 
21 The industry average is calculated for each firm individually by subtracting a firms own evaluation of 
patents or secrecy from the industry total and dividing this sum by the total number of firms in the industry 
minus one (see also footnote 19). Similarly, the sector average is calculated by subtracting the industry 
evaluation (without the firm) form the total in the sector and dividing this sum by the number of firms in 
all industries but the firms.  
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included at the sector level (manufacturing vs. services) to control for intra-industry 
spillover effects (secr_sector).22 
As it turns out the industry-level measures of the importance of patent protection 
and protection by secrecy are highly correlated (Spearman Correlation coefficient: 
.88), not only at the industry level but also at the level of the individual firm, 
indicating that firms use both methods together, as already proposed by 
Cohen and Walsh (2000) and Arora (1997). Because of that, they can not be included 
in the same regression equation. In order to be able to investigate differences 
between the effect of patent protection methods and secrecy with respect to 
knowledge spillovers nonetheless, we calculated the relative importance of patents 
and secrecy in an industry as the share of enterprises that indicated that secrecy is 
more important than patents (rel_secr_ind) and the share of enterprises that indicated 
that patents are more important than secrecy protection (rel_pat_ind)23. At the firm 
level 19% of all enterprises indicated that secrecy is more important than patent 
protection, 67% assigned equal importance and 14% rated patents as more important. 
In addition to these core variables a number of control variables were added at the 
right hand-side of the model. These variables are meant to control for characteristics 
and capabilities of a given firm that are assumed to influence its ability to use 
external sources of knowledge and could thus increase the likelihood that a firm 
perceives the lack of information on technologies as an obstacle to innovation. To 
give an example, if a firm has little absorptive capacities, it is usually not able to 
access and use the knowledge available outside its boundaries, not because 
knowledge is not there or because it is protected by appropriability mechanisms, but 
simply because it is unable to understand, assimilate or use it. 
Four variables are included to represent the absorptive capacity of a firm (see 
Daghfous, 2004; Schmidt, 2005a for reviews on the determinants of absorptive 
capacity). The R&D intensity (R&D_int), calculated as the share of R&D spending 
of turnover, and the squared R&D intensity to allow for a non-linear effect 
(R&D_int2), a dummy indicating that the firm undertakes R&D continuously 
(R&D_con)24, and the share of employees with higher education degrees of total 
employees (grads). The R&D related measures also represent firms’ ability to 
generate knowledge in-house through own R&D and their demand for knowledge, if 
one assumes that the more R&D a firm does the more knowledge it needs. 
The demand for knowledge is also represented by the innovativeness of the firm. In 
a study on hampering factors for small and medium sized enterprises (SME) 
Rammer et al. (2005b) report that in 2002 the share of SMEs reporting obstacles to 
innovation is higher for firms which are more deeply involved in innovation 
                                                 
22 See footnote 21. 
23 In order to control for inter-industry effects the equation used to estimate that model also contains a variable 
for the importance of patent protection AND secrecy in the sector (manufacturing or services) of the firm 
(prot_sector). 
24 The R&D intensity and the variable continuous R&D was constructed using a question that was only asked 
for firms which did report innovation activtities. For firms without any innovation activities we set them to 
zero. 
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activities. The authors argue that intensively innovating firms are more likely to 
report the existence of obstacles than less innovative firms because their projects are 
more complex and they undertake more projects at the same time, which can also be 
interpreted as a higher demand for knowledge. To control for this we include two 
dummy variables, one indicating whether the firm has introduced a product 
innovation that was new to its market (mneu) and one indicating whether the firm 
has introduced a process innovation (pz) between 2002 and 2004. 
As an additional control for the effect that some firms might in general have a 
higher probability to be (subjectively) more hampered by obstacles to their 
innovation activities than others our models include a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the firm indicates that at least one of the 13 other obstacles to innovation 
was at least of medium importance (bed_hemm). 
The analysis of the data from the Mannheim Innovation panel has revealed that 
East and West German firms still differ considerable with respect to their innovation 
activities (see e.g. Rammer et al., 2005a; Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). A dummy 
variable, which takes the value one if the firm is from the Neue Länder is thus also 
included in our model (east). In addition to that, two variables for the size of the firm 
were included, the log of the number of employees (lnempl) and a squared term 
(lnempl2). 
To ensure that the two industry-level variables for the protection methods don’t just 
pick up any industry specific effects, we included three industry group dummies for 
medium-low-tech manufacturing (NACE 23; 25-28; 351) high-tech manufacturing 
(NACE 244, 30, 32, 33, 353), and high-tech services (NACE 64, 72, 73), with other 
manufacturing and services (NACE 10-29 (exc. 244) , 31, 34, 35-37 (excl. 353), 
40+41, 45, 50-52, 55, 60-63, 65-67, 70, 71, 74, 75, 90, 92) being the reference 
group.25 
The average firm in our sample has about 710 employees. Over 20% of the 
employees of these firms are highly educated. More than 30% of the firms do R&D 
continuously and spend on average 3% of their turnover on R&D activities. 24% 
have introduced product innovations that were new to their market between 2002 and 
2004, and 42% introduced process innovations. Almost half of the firms have 
experienced the lack of technological information as a hampering factor for their 
innovation activities, 38% said it was only somewhat important, about 10% it was an 
important hampering factor, and around 1% indicated it was very important. 32% of 
all our enterprises are from East Germany. The share of high-tech manufacturing 
firms in the sample is 9% and the share of high-tech services is 7%.26 
Since the responses to our dependent variable are in natural order from 0 to 3, we 
will use an ordered probit estimation procedure, which outperforms other models 
(e.g. multinominal probit and simple OLS) in this case (Greene, 2002, Kennedy, 
                                                 
25 The inclusion of more detailed industry dummies would certainly have benefited our analysis. But most 
other industry dummies we tried were correlated with other right hand side variables we wanted to keep. 
Most notably was the correlation between the industry dummies and the variable for continuous R&D. 
26 A table with additional descriptive statistics can be found in the annex. 
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1998). The model is similar to the regular binominal model in the sense that the 
observed variable is assumed to be related to an underlying continuous measure that 
is unobservable. Because this latent variable can take more than two values (as is the 
case in the probit model) several parameters or boundary values have to be estimated 
using a maximum likelihood procedure. 
The formal model in our case looks like this: 
 
* 'y Xβ ε= +   
 
where y* is the unobserved variable and X is the vector of all the independent 
variables described above. This formula can then be used to estimate the boundary 
parameters for a change in the dependent variable hemm_tech_info: 
 
1
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2 3
0 * 0
1 0 *
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5 Results 
The results from the ordered probit regressions indicate that both patent protection 
and protection through secrecy increase the perceived lack of information on 
technology as a hampering factor for innovation activities significantly.27 However, 
only the industry-level variables are significant. This indicates that the use of 
protection methods by other firms from a firm’s own industry hampers its innovation 
activities more than the use of protection methods by firms in other industries. 
Consequently, hypothesis 1 and 2 can only be confirmed for the industry-level of 
protection. Furthermore, the estimations suggest, that the appropriability effect of 
patents outweighs the disclosure effect in an industry. If this were not the case, the 
coefficient on patent protection should have been either negative or not significant, 
as is the case for the importance of patent protection in all industries in a firm’s 
sector beside its own. Since both coefficients for the industry-level measure, that for 
patent protection and that for secrecy are positive and significant there is evidence 
that they both reduce knowledge spillovers, i.e. the amount of valuable and usable 
knowledge available to others in an industry. Both mechanisms can be seen as a way 
to hinder the innovation activities of competitors and other firms in the same industry 
and appropriate the returns from inventions and innovations through limiting the 
availability of useful knowledge outside ones own boundaries. Due to the high 
correlation between the secrecy and patent variable they can not be included 
separately in a single equation. In order to test whether the effect of patents is 
significantly different from secrecy, we estimate the effect of the share of firms in an 
industry indicating that patents are more important than secrecy and the share of 
firms indicating the opposite is true on our dependent variable. The results in the last 
column (3) of Table 1 show that both variables are not significant, providing further 
evidence that both protection methods influence the innovation activities of firms 
similarly.28 
The insignificance of the sector-level variables is surprising. One interpretation of 
this result is that firms’ innovation activities rely more on knowledge from a firms 
own industry and less on knowledge from other industries. Then again, some 
empirical studies have found intra-industry spillovers of particular relevance for 
firms’ innovation behavior and innovation performance (e.g. Inkmann, 2000; Steurs, 
1995). An alternative explanation is more technical, maybe our measure of 
protection at the sector level is too broadly defined and should rather than include all 
industries outside a firms own industry only include industries with which the firm is 
closely related, e.g. through input-output relations or similar technologies. A third 
explanation is that firms protect knowledge that is only relevant for the innovation 
activities of a firm in the same industry, but not for firms in other industries. 
                                                 
27 To test the robustness of the results, we ran the same regressions with slightly modified measures for patent 
protection and secrecy. We used two dummies indicating if the respective appropriability mechanisms 
were at least of medium importance. In both cases the results didn’t change. 
28 Joint significance of the two variables could also be rejected. 
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Table 1: Regression results of ordered probit estimations (dependent variable: 
importance of lack of information on technologies as an obstacle to innovation) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Importance of patent protection (industry level) 0.261**   
  (0.149)   
Importance of patent protection (sector level) 0.134   
  (0.236)   
Importance of  protection by secrecy (industry level)  0.349**  
   (0.176)  
Importance of protection by secrecy (sector level)  0.208  
   (0.396)  
Share of firms indicating that patents > secrecy  
(industry level)   0.289 
    (0.496) 
Share of firms indicating that secrecy > patents  
(industry level)   0.706 
    (0.434) 
Importance of protection by secrecy + patents 
 (sector level)   0.177 
    (0.298) 
Share of employees with higher education degree in % -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D intensity 0.174 0.176 0.245 
  (0.268) (0.266) (0.266) 
R&D intensity, squared -0.069 -0.068 -0.084 
  (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Continuous in-house R&D -0.096* -0.099* -0.090* 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Importance of other hampering factors 3.186*** 3.184*** 3.184*** 
  (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) 
Market novelty (dummy) 0.004 0.003 0.006 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Process Innovation (dummy) 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Number of employees, log 0.055 0.054 0.053 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Number of employees, log, squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.155*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Industry Groups (dummy) YES YES YES 
Observations 3,403 3,403 3,403 
Loglikelihood -3019.98 -3019.64 -3020.05 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
Our control variables offer some interesting insights as well. Only one of the 
proxies for absorptive capacity is highly significant and has the expected sign. The 
more absorptive capacity a firms has in the form of highly educated employees the 
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less likely it is that this firm perceives the lack of information on technologies as an 
obstacle to innovation, i.e. the more likely it is to receive knowledge spillovers. The 
negative and slightly significant coefficient of the continuous in-house R&D 
activities provides further evidence that higher absorptive capacity, increases the 
ability to access knowledge and thus mitigates the problem of a lack of information 
on technology. 
The lack of significance for the R&D intensity variables can be explained by 
differing effects of R&D on absorptive capacity and the demand for knowledge. 
R&D is not only conducted in order to build absorptive capacities, which would 
decrease the importance of the obstacle, but also to generate innovations. If firms 
invest heavily in the development of innovations, their knowledge requirements are 
higher if they invest only a small fraction of their turnover in R&D. At the same time 
their own research generates ideas and opens their mind to technological 
opportunities, for which additional knowledge is required. These new projects are 
likely to be more of an explorative nature, which require more complex and not 
readily available knowledge than exploitive projects. As a result of the higher 
knowledge requirements the likelihood that these firms run into the problem of a lack 
of technological innovation is higher as well. To summarize this point, firms with a 
larger share of R&D expenditure per turnover, see a whole range of technological 
opportunities and thus perceive the lack of information to be more relevant than 
firms which have a low share and as a result a more narrow field of view with 
respect to technological opportunities. These “perception” effects clearly works in 
the opposite direction as the effects of absorptive capacity on knowledge spillovers 
discussed in the previous sections and as our results for R&D activities suggest, 
cancel each other out (partially). For continuous R&D activities the same arguments 
can be brought forward. Our estimation results suggest, however, that for continuous 
R&D activities the effect on absorptive capacity is stronger than the perception 
effect. 
The variable for other obstacles (bed_hemm) is highly significant, indicating that 
the obstacles to innovation are highly related to each other. We think that the 
inclusion of this variable controls for this baseline effect. 
Process innovators are significantly more hampered in their innovation activities 
than non-innovators, while innovators with market novelties are not. This is 
surprising, since usually it is assumed that process innovations are based on internal 
knowledge and learning by doing while product innovations and in particular market 
novelties require more external knowledge. Our results suggest the opposite, 
however 
Size matters for the perception of the importance of information on technologies as 
an obstacle to innovation, as expected. However, the relationship between size and 
the obstacle is not a linear one, but is inverse U-shaped. The turning point is between 
firms with 90 and 200 employees. For smaller firms it might be a less important 
obstacle, because they just follow a small number of (innovation) projects at the 
same time (Rammer et al., 2005b) or focus on technologies where they have all the 
knowledge required to bring inventions to markets. They rather lack the marketing 
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knowledge and financial means to introduce innovations. Large firms, on the 
opposite, have many projects going on at the same time and require lots of 
knowledge. They nonetheless assign less importance to the lack of information as 
medium sized firms. A reason for this might be that they have the capability, 
resources and established channels to gather the external knowledge needed in their 
innovation processes and are thus not hindered as much in their innovation activities 
as medium-sized firms. 
Finally, East German firms assign a lower importance to the lack of information on 
technology, than West German firms. The difference is only marginally significant 
and only in two out of three equations, however. The difference might stem from the 
fact that East German firms are more likely to adopt a follower strategy in their 
innovation activities (see Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). If they rely on a follower 
strategy the lack of information becomes less of a problem, because all the 
information required for imitating a new product or process has to be available 
before it can be imitated. Their strategy is more one of exploiting available 
knowledge instead of exploring new opportunities. As a result they adopt a more 
narrow innovation approach and decreases the amount of external knowledge 
required. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we study the influence of the usage of patent protection and protection 
by secrecy in an industry on knowledge spillovers. Since knowledge spillovers can 
not be measured directly we investigate the effects of protection on the lack of 
knowledge spillovers, i.e. technological knowledge. We treat the two appropriability 
mechanisms separately, because their basic set-up is quite different, while patents 
have a build-in requirement to disclose knowledge and provide a legal basis for the 
protection of knowledge, secrecy relies on non-disclosure, but is not defendable in 
court. Our findings indicate that both patents and secrecy decrease knowledge 
spillovers to other firms in an industry and consequently pose obstacles to their 
innovation activities. Because of that we can conclude, that the appropriability effect 
outweighs the disclosure effect of patents within an industry. We do not find a 
significant effect of protection methods used in other industries on the lack of 
information on technologies a firm is faced with. 
Since the protection or appropriability effect of patents outweighs the disclosure 
effect within an industry, we can conclude that the open innovation business model 
has not been implemented in the industries we investigate to an extent that it shows 
up in our data. The insignificance of the sector-level variables for protection methods 
supports this hypothesis. The open innovation paradigm suggests that the 
management of IP rights and the use of patents should increase knowledge flows to 
external partners rather than hinder them. However, the results obtained from the 
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ordered probit models indicate that the majority of firms didn’t use patent protection 
between 2002 and 2004 to make their knowledge freely available. On the contrary, 
firms used patents to protect knowledge from usage by other firms in their industry. 
Then again, maybe firms tried to be more open, but the firms requiring the external 
knowledge didn’t get the impression that they can easily get access to the knowledge 
on technology made available. Future studies should thus try to consider both sides 
of the knowledge spillovers in empirical studies on open innovation. What is more, 
we only analyzed one aspect of the open innovation paradigm. The investigation of 
the licensing behavior of firms would certainly enrich our understanding of the 
situation and might lead to a different conclusion. If firms use patents to initially 
reduce knowledge flows but than license all patents to external partners, this could 
well be considered open innovation. 
The descriptive statistics as well as the regression results provide clear evidence 
that we are not in a world of “open source innovation”, i.e. all new knowledge is 
made available. Not only are both types of protection methods used to reduce 
knowledge flows, they are also assigned equal importance by almost all firms. Note, 
the open innovation paradigm doesn’t proposes this extreme form of open 
innovation. 
Some suggestions for future research are the following: 
The analysis could be enriched by including additional legal or strategic protection 
methods, like lead-time advantages or copyrights. Their expected effect on spillovers 
is less clear. Copyrights, for example, provide legal rights to a whole document or 
product, not necessarily to the knowledge transferred. To give an example from our 
own profession: You cannot copy a section form a copyrighted article directly, but 
you can use the main idea of the article as the starting point for your studies. 
To our knowledge this study is one of the first to investigate the prevalence of open 
innovation empirically. The discussion of the open innovation paradigm would 
certainly profit from further empirical studies on the usage of IP to transfer 
knowledge and the role of appropriability in the open innovation concept in general. 
This paper is based on data from the fourth Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
Similar surveys were conducted in all member states of the European Union in 2005, 
using the harmonized Eurostat questionnaire and methodology. It would certainly be 
of interested to compare our findings with those of other countries, taking into 
account the differences in the intellectual property systems in the respective country. 
Questions like those used for the construction of the variables in our study, have also 
been included in previous CIS surveys, opening up the opportunity to asses 
developments over time. 
 20
7 Annex 
Table 1: Variables included in the model 
Variable Type Construction 
Hemm_tech_info ordered Variable that takes a value between 0 and 1 according to the 
following scheme: The lack of information on technology as 
an obstacle to innovation was not relevant (0), of minor 
importance (1), important (2), or very important (3). 
Pat_ind  Importance of patent protection as a method to protect 
inventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 
1 (highly important). Calculated at the industry level 
excluding the firm in question. 
Pat_sector  Importance of patent protection as a method to protect 
inventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 
1 (highly important). Calculated at the sector level 
excluding the industry of the firm in question. 
Secr_ind  Importance of secrecy as a method to protect inventions and 
innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 1 (highly 
important). Calculated at the industry level excluding the 
firm in question. 
Secr_sector  Importance of secrecy as a method to protect inventions and 
innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 1 (highly 
important). Calculated at the sector level excluding the 
industry of the firm in question. 
Prot_sector  Importance of secrecy and patents as a method to protect 
inventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 
1 (highly important). Calculated at the sector level 
excluding the industry of the firm in question. 
Rel_secr_ind  Share of firms indicating that secrecy is more important than 
patents (industry level) 
Rel_pat_ind  Share of firms indicating that patents are more important 
than secrecy (industry level) 
Grads 
% Share of employees with higher education in total 
employees. 
R&D_int % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2004 
(Zero for firms without innovation activities) 
R&D_int2 % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2004, squared  
(Zero for firms without innovation activities) 
R&Dcon Dummy One, if firm was engaged in R&D activities continuously 
bed_hemm Dummy One, if firm perceived at least one of 13 obstacles to 
innovation as medium important. 
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Variable Type Construction 
mneu Dummy One, if the firm introduced at least one product innovation 
that was new to its market between 2002 and 2004. 
pz Dummy One, if the firm introduced at least one process innovation 
between 2002 and 2004. 
Lnempl Log Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2004 
Lnempl2 Log Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2004, squared
east Dummy One, if a firm is located in Eastern Germany. 
bres_1 Dummy One, if a firm is from medium-low-tech manufacturing 
bres_1 Dummy One, if a firm is from high-tech manufacturing. 
bres_2 Dummy One, if a firm is from high-tech services. 
Table 2: Industries included 
Name Label NACE 
Other manufacturing and 
services 
bres_0 10-22; 24 (excl. 244); 29; 31; 34-
37 (excl. 353); 40-41; 45; 50-52; 
60-67; 70-74; 90; 92 
Medium-low-tech  
manufactring bres_1 23; 25-28; 351 
High-tech manufacturing bres_2 244; 30;32; 33; 353 
High-tech services bres_3 64; 72; 73 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics I 
lack of information on 
technologies is number of observations percentage 
very important 64 1.9% 
important 360 10.6% 
somewhat important 1,304 38.3% 
not relevant 1,675 49.2% 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics II 
  Mean Mean Mean t-value 
  Sample 
Firms without  
lack of 
information 
on 
technologies 
Firms with 
lack  
of information 
on 
technologies 
T-Test for 
mean 
difference
Observations 3,403 1,675 1,728   
% of total - 49.2% 50.8%   
Importance of patent protection (industry level) 0.188 0.165 0.210 -7.553
  (0.173) (0.167) (0.177)   
Importance of strategic protection (industry level) 0.291 0.268 0.313 -7.963
  (0.165) (0.161) (0.166)   
Importance of patent protection (sector level) 0.185 0.181 0.188 -2.038
 (0.100) (0.096) (0.099) 
Importance of strategic protection (sector level) 0.286 0.285 0.287 -1.353
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) 
Share of firms indicating that  
secrecy > patents (industry level) 0.178 0.169 0.186 -6,844
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) 
Share of firms indicating that  
patents > secrecy (industry level) 0.178 0.175 0.180 -3,304
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Share of employees with higher education. in % 20.500 20.565 20.436 0.159
  (23.638) (24.066) (23.223)   
R&D intensity 0.033 0.026 0.040 -3.127
  (0.126) (0.106) (0.143)   
Continuous R&D (dummy) 0.315 0.266 0.363 -6.176
  (0.465) (0.442) (0.481)   
Importance of other hampering factors (dummy) 0.833 0.661 0.999 -29.221
  (0.373) (0.474) (0.024)   
Market novelty (dummy) 0.243 0.193 0.292 -6.778
  (0.429) (0.395) (0.455)   
Process Innovator (dummy) 0.422 0.348 0.494 -7.680
  (0.558) (0.547) (0.559)   
Number of Employees 710.304 607.238 810.208 -0.874
  (6787.111) (6283.552) (7242.315)   
East Germany (dummy) 0.325 0.357 0.293 3.967
  (0.468) (0.479) (0.455)   
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 0.142 0.122 0.161 -3.226
  (0.349) (0.328) (0.368)   
High-tech manufacturing 0.088 0.066 0.109 -4.461
  (0.284) (0.249) (0.312)   
High-tech services 0.074 0.072 0.075 -0.334
  (0.261) (0.259) (0.264)   
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Table 5: Coefficients of ordered probit estimations (dependent variable: importance 
of lack of information on technologies as an obstacle to innovation) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Importance of patent protection (industry level) 0.261**   
 (0.149)   
Importance of patent protection (sector level) 0.134   
 (0.236)   
Importance of  protection by secrecy (industry level)  0.349**  
  (0.176)  
Importance of protection by secrecy (sector level)  0.208  
  (0.396)  
Share of firms indicating that patents > secrecy (industry level)   0.289 
   (0.496) 
Share of firms indicating that secrecy > patents (industry level)   0.706 
   (0.434) 
Importance of protection by secrecy + patents (sector level)   0.177 
   (0.298) 
Share of employees with higher education degree in % -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D intensity 0.174 0.176 0.245 
 (0.268) (0.266) (0.266) 
R&D intensity, squared -0.069 -0.068 -0.084 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Continuous in-house R&D -0.096* -0.099* -0.090* 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Importance of other hampering factors 3.186*** 3.184*** 3.184*** 
 (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) 
Market novelty (dummy) 0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Process Innovation (dummy) 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Number of employees, log 0.055 0.054 0.053 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Number of employees, log, squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.155*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 0.114* 0.114* 0.109* 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
High-tech manufacturing 0.096 0.065 0.064 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.085) 
High-tech Services 0.052 0.006 -0.014 
 (0.093) (0.098) (0.117) 
Observations 3,403 3,403 3,403 
McKelvey and Zavoina Pseudo R2 0.595 0.595 0.595 
X^2 150.99 151.80 151.86 
Loglikelihood -3019.98 -3019.64 -3020.05 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
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